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SOME DIFFICULTIES IN ASSURING EQUALITY
AND AVOIDING ENDORSEMENT
JESSE H. CHOPER*
I am very happy to be here at Villanova for the first time and particularly
pleased to be present to hear Professor Nussbaum's presentation, which
was most informative in content and thoroughly delightful in delivery.
Professor Nussbaum's position is that the real meaning of our consti-
tutional traditions with respect to religion and government is securing re-
ligious liberty. I fully agree. She believes that two principles should be
pursued in order to achieve this. One is assuring equality, and the other is
avoiding government endorsement ("announcement of a religious ortho-
doxy"). Though I accept both of these broad goals, I would suggest sev-
eral strong qualifications, especially regarding the role of the Supreme
Court.
First, Professor Nussbaum's goal of "equal respect," "full equal re-
spect," or "full equality" is both hard to define, and it is problematic as a
matter of constitutional policy. Second, difficulties arise in forbidding
government endorsement, especially when it does not pose a meaningful
threat to religious liberty. Let me illustrate these problems in the context
of four actual practices, all of which have been alluded to by Professor
Nussbaum and considered by the Supreme Court.
First: The Free Exercise Clause requirement, between 1963 and 1990,
of exemptions from generally applicable regulations unless there is a com-
pelling state interest.1 I agree that the test originally announced in Sherbert
was right, and that its subsequent repudiation in Employment Division v.
Smith was wrong.2 My position supports the Supreme Court's key role in
protecting religious minorities who are not well represented in the politi-
cal process and therefore often likely either to be deliberately ignored or
just overlooked by popularly elected lawmakers or their designees.
Although the Smith rule was grounded in equality and neutrality be-
tween religion and non-religion, the Sherbert test plainly favors religion. 3
* Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of California, Berkeley,
School of Law. The rationale for my views is elaborated in JESSE H. CHOPER,
SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY' PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
RELIGION CLAUSES (1995) (articulating comprehensive thesis for dealing with all
issues arising under Religion Clauses).
1. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (using compelling state inter-
est test on religious infringement).
2. See id. at 406-09 (applying compelling state interest and finding exemption
required); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding no exception
required for sacramental use of Peyote drug for Native Americans).
3. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409 (demanding government exemption for relig-
ious differences in most circumstances).
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Consider the exemption granted Mrs. Sherbert from the unemployment
compensation requirement of accepting "suitable work."4 Suppose she
simply felt a strong obligation to stay at home with her children on both
Saturday and Sunday. Or imagine that Mr. Smith chewed peyote seeds,
for which he was prosecuted, simply because he liked the effect.5 (Admit-
tedly, this would be a very unlikely situation because chewing peyote is
usually nauseating and very unpleasant.) 6 In either case, persons denied
unemployment compensation or prosecuted for using peyote who knew
that there was an exemption that applied only to Sabbatarians or Native
Americans would justifiably feel that they were getting unequal treatment
and that religion was being treated favorably. Indeed, they would reasona-
bly perceive the Sherbert rule as governmental support of a religious ortho-
doxy and see themselves as being in the "out" group. This demonstrates
the conflict between preserving liberty for minorities and the endorse-
ment approach.
Second: The matter of whether privately financed religious symbols
on public property are impermissible government acknowledgments of re-
ligion. Consider the creche, paid for by the local Roman Catholic Church,
displayed on the grand staircase of the Pittsburgh courthouse in Allegheny
County.7 I believe that this should be permitted even though it would
favor religion. Indeed, it would favor some religions over others. I con-
cede that this would generate feelings of resentment and outsider status by
some people. (I can say that as someone who was raised as an observant
Jew.) If I were a legislator, I would probably oppose use of a creche in this
way. But, unlike situations as in Sherbert and Smith, where persons are sub-
ject to penalties or pressures to act contrary to their religious beliefs, I
don't believe that allowing the courthouse display is a meaningful interfer-
ence with religious liberty despite the fact that it causes feelings of "out-
sider" status.
Similarly, most governmental recognition of Christmas does not pro-
duce the meaningful interference with religious liberty that is at the core
of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Thus, I believe that
the Court ordinarily should not reject the benign wishes of the majority to
recognize Christmas. The creche in Allegheny County was not displayed in
order to disparage non-Christians.8 It was simply to satisfy the majority's
own felt needs.9  It is similar to our National Proclamation of
4. See id. at 410 (holding that exemption exists for religious observation of
Sabbath).
5. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (describing how employees were fired and then
denied unemployment benefits for ingestion of peyote).
6. See ADAM GoTTLIEB, PEYOTE AND OTHER PSYCHOACTIVE CACTI 19 (1997)
(describing chewed peyote as having extremely bitter taste).
7. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989) (identifying
creche at issue).
8. See id. at 580-81 (identifying celebratory nature of creche and association
with caroling program dedicated to world peace and prisoners of war).
9. See id. at 580 (describing creche as visual representation of Jesus' birth).
[Vol. 54: p. 613
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Thanksgiving-which means Thanksgiving to God-that should also be
permitted. 10 This also applies to closing all public buildings on Christmas,
but not on comparable holidays of other religions.1 1 Even though these
laws plainly favor some religions over others and therefore generate "out-
sider" feelings, they cause no meaningful threat to anyone's religious lib-
erty and should not be judicially enforceable violations of the separation
of church and state.
Other examples are our national motto, "In God We Trust," and the
words "Under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. 12 I do not believe that
these should be held generally invalid. On the other hand, daily recitation
of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools should not be allowed even if
there is an excusal provision. That should be unconstitutional because of
the peer group pressures on children to participate, even when it may be
contrary to their religious beliefs. This is meaningful interference with
their religious liberty.
Third: Public subsidy of religion as part of a neutral government pro-
gram. Although religion should sometimes be favored, as under the Sher-
bert test, sometimes religion should be disfavored. Neither "equality" nor
"neutrality" are self-defining concepts. I would hold public subsidy of re-
ligion unconstitutional, even when it is included in a broad, neutral gov-
ernment program, such as property tax exemption. Tax exemptions for
church property dedicated to sacred purposes-as opposed to, say, accred-
ited parochial schools-should be a violation of the Establishment Clause
even though this would treat religion unequally and unfavorably. These
exemptions involve a coercive (though indirect) infringement of religious
liberty because compulsory taxes would be used to involuntarily support
either one's own religion or, usually even worse, someone else's.
Consider a hypothetical city council that decides to support all volun-
tary organizations by paying for their symbols. So, it agrees to buy insignia
for the Cancer Society, the 4-H Club, and other such groups. I think that
if they also buy crucifixes and Stars of David for religious groups, it should
be a violation of the Establishment Clause.
The Sherbert decision also highlights the problem of compulsorily
raised tax funds being used to support religion. As indicated earlier,
under the rule of the Sherbert case, an exemption might have been required
by the Free Exercise Clause because refusing unemployment benefits to
Mrs. Sherbert substantially interfered with her religion. Still, the exemp-
tion meant that she would receive public funds because of her religion
through the coercive, compelled use of taxes. The Establishment Clause
should bar this.
10. See 5 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (2006) (declaring Thanksgiving federal holiday).
11. See 5 U.S.C § 6103(a) (2006) (declaring December 25 federal holiday).
12. See 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (codifying "In God We Trust" as national
motto); 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (stating text of Pledge and proper recitation).
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Note the further difficulties, if Mrs. Sherbert were given unemploy-
ment benefits, for persons who oppose the inclusion of church-related
schools in a program of general aid to elementary and secondary educa-
tion. Just as Mrs. Sherbert would be financially disadvantaged because of
her religion if she did not receive benefits, so too would those persons
who wish to send their children to church-related schools because of their
religion. In both instances, the government requires payment to exercise
your religion. In Mrs. Sherbert's case it meant forfeiting unemployment
compensation. The same result applies for Roman Catholic or Orthodox
Jewish parents, or those of other religions, who believe their faith requires
them to send their children to church-related schools. Indeed, because a
high percentage of parochial school education is secular, excluding them
from general aid programs would appear to disfavor religion whereas
granting an exemption to Mrs. Sherbert exclusively on the basis of her
religious beliefs would appear to favor religion.
Fourth: The enormous subjectivity in respect to who is the "reasona-
ble observer" or "objective observer" under the endorsement test. Al-
though there are often close questions in constitutional law, the
reasonable observer issue seems to be peculiarly troublesome, as is illus-
trated by the constant division of the Court over it. In Allegheny County, the
justices split on the creche in the courthouse, the Christmas tree and the
menorah, and the "Salute to Liberty" sign by the mayor. This division,
over what Professor Nussbaum herself recognizes as involving "subtle is-
sues of context and perceptions . . . [that] could be decided either way,"
was repeated in the more recent Ten Commandments cases as well as a
number of others. When such uncertainty occurs in the political process,
legislators often must guess on the best course of action. They may choose
to experiment or to take one step at a time. Thus, if the current stimulus
plan doesn't work, President Obama has told us that we will try something
else. I doubt anyone has any better advice for him. Regrettably, when the
nine justices of the Supreme Court try to identify the "reasonable, objec-
tive observer," it often becomes perfectly clear that it means a majority of
themselves. This kind of uncertainty, in my judgment, is inconsistent with
the principled role required of the Supreme Court in exercising its awe-
some power of judicial review and telling popularly elected, politically re-
sponsible representatives what they can and cannot do.
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